The Arctic is known for its abundant reserve of natural resources. Last decade has seen some exploration and production activities in this region. The assurance of safe operations in this region is a critical and challenging task because of the harsh environment, the remoteness of operation sites, the limited infrastructure, and resources available in response to emergent situations, the application of costly equipment and facilities, and the sensitive marine environment. For complex process systems operating in a harsh environment, the scope of conventional risk assessment is not enough because of the highly uncertain environment, and its impacts on equipment performance. Risk assessment needs to be extended to include both the pre-failure and the post-failure phases. Additionally, risk assessment approaches under normal operating, and environmental conditions may not be applicable in the Arctic regions with unique and uncertain characteristics of the harsh environment. Therefore, this study aims to develop a quantitative resilience assessment method for process units operating under Arctic extreme conditions. Dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) is applied to model the probabilistic relationships between causes and effects in a dynamic manner. The proposed method is applied to the resilience assessment of a separator (as part of an oil production system). The proposed approach will help reveal the critical operating parameters under extreme conditions for process units. It also helps identify potential design improvement to enhance process safety.
Introduction
The Arctic is known for its undeveloped abundant natural resources. However, it is challenging to ensure safe and reliable production and development of natural resources in this region. Process operations in Arctic environments, facing high risks and various hazards, require additional design or operational arrangements to save the operating process systems from disruptions. Comparing to the same system operating in a temperate region, the effects of hazards are amplified by the harsh environmental conditions, such as icing, snowstorms, strong winds, darkness, and remoteness to emergency support bases (Naseri 2017) . Such conditions would affect severely on the mental attitude and work efficiency of the personnel, posing the human factor as one of the main reasons for possible system disruptions (Noroozi et al. 2013) . Some unique risk factors of Arctic environments, such as uncertain harsh environmental conditions and their impacts on systems' performance, lack of knowledge and operational experience, limited resources available for emergency responses due to remoteness, make resilience assessment more essential than risk assessment for process systems operating in harsh environments.
Under Arctic conditions, the system will operate at or close to its design limits. This significantly reduces the lifetime of the equipment and increases the probability of system failure (Naseri 2017) . Winterization could be the most prominent measure to increase the reliability of the system and minimize the disruption possibility and effects in a harsh cold environment. Standard winterization measures include but not limited to insulation, heat tracing, de-icing equipment, chemical seals, antifreeze additives, and ice-repellent coatings (Yang et al. 2013 ). Malfunction of one of the winterization methods applied to the system may lead to the operational instability, consequent system outage, the occurrence of cascading abnormal events, and finally, result in a severe accident. Thus, minimization of human factor and enhancing the functionality of winterization measures would help to build more resilient systems in Arctic environments.
Functionality represents the capability of the system to perform its prescribed functions. The state of functionality of the system could be classified as "high" or "low", where high functionality state refers to the capability of the system to perform all of its functions, whereas low functionality state refers to the inability to perform majority or all of the required functions or perform but at the reduced level (Birolini 2013) .
The term resilience was firstly introduced in materials engineering, where it characterized the ability of the material to return to the original shape after a deformation (Trautwine 1907) . Later, this term was used in the sphere of ecology by Holling, where he described resilience as the ability of the ecological state to absorb the disruptions and maintaining the original state (Holling 1973) . After that the resilience has started to be applied in the spheres of economics (Perrings 2006) (Fiksel 2006 ) (Rose and Liao 2005) , psychology (Luthar et al. 2000 ) (Bonanno 2004) , social (Kendra and Wachtendorf 2003) , and organizational (Burnard and Bhamra 2011) (Adger 2000) systems. In each of these spheres, resilience was characterized as the ability of the system to absorb the disruption, adapt to it, and recover from it. Resilience in process engineering is instead a new term, as it is started to be used only in the last decade. In comparison with risk assessment, resilience assessment focuses on the characterization of the system's functionality before and after the disruption. Thus, resilience assessment focuses on not only the failure prevention methods but also the recovery of the system to the normal functional state after the disruption (Tong and Yang 2019) . According to Yodo et al. (Yodo et al. 2017) , the resilience characterizes the ability of a system to confront the hazards, or in case of mishaps occurred to restore the system to its normal operational state. A more resilient system also presents the abilities to adapt and learn from the disruptions occurred (Birolini 2013) . Tong and Yang (Tong and Yang 2019) have claimed that resilience as a system property consists of four attributes: absorption, adaptation, restoration, and learning.
& Absorption -the ability of a system to absorb the disruption (e.g., through inherent safer design). & Adaptation -the ability to restore a system by its internal measure (e.g., through redundancy).
& Restoration -the ability of a system to get recovered with the application of external measures (e.g., through maintenance and repair). & Learning-the ability of a system to learn from past experiences, knowledge, and previous disruption. This helps practitioners in predicting and avoiding disruptions.
These four attributes can be used to build a model to quantify resilience based on a new definition -"the probability of a system's functionality state sustaining a "high functionality" state or restoring to a "high functionality" state from a "low functionality" state during and after the occurrence of disruptions in the operation of a system within a specific time." (Tong and Yang 2019) .
The application of the safety measures to enhance resilience in engineering design and operation is not fully implemented yet. The reason is that the resilience measures applicable to the system are mostly unique because various systems show different vulnerabilities (Tong and Yang 2019) . Vulnerability characterizes the tendency of the system to fail under the effect of disruption. The system mainly could be characterized as vulnerable due to the low absorption capabilities. Furthermore, inability of the system to learn from disruption during the adaptation and restoration of the system characterizes it also as vulnerable (Tong and Yang 2019) . In this study, the resilience of the winterization measure (i.e., electrical heat tracing) on a separator will be assessed using the generic resilience assessment method proposed in (Tong and Yang 2019) . The method was universalized to the power loss or overcurrent issues that could happen to any heat-traced process units operating in harsh cold environments.
Bayesian network (BN) is an acyclic graph which can be used to connect the failures and their causes through conditional probability tables. BNs can perform failure analysis based on multiple interdependent causes and work with partial failures and update the estimated failure probabilities when new data and information becomes available (Uday and Marais 2015; Yodo and Wang 2016) . Additionally, the types and magnitudes of disruptions are highly uncertain. This makes resilience more challenging to be assessed. Such an assessment needs to be supplemented by subjective judgments. BNs allow the utilization of subjective judgments in probability estimation. As the system tends to change its state of functionality with time due to the uncertainties present in the system itself and the external disruptions, it becomes more crucial to observe and model the dynamic change of the functionality state of process systems before and after disruptions. Therefore, in this study, Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) is selected for the quantitative analysis of the system resilience (in terms of change of functionality) through assessing the system's absorption, adaptation, restoration, and learning capabilities. Recently Yodo et al. (Yodo et al. 2017) have developed a methodology based on DBN to model the resilience of an engineered system (Yodo et al. 2017) . The present study differs from the work of Yodo et al. (Yodo et al. 2017 ) by focusing on winterized process systems operating in harsh cold environments and providing an approach for assessing their resilience and design for more resilient systems.
This paper aims to develop an approach to quantify the resilience of winterized process systems dynamically in harsh environments. The proposed method uses the dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) to assess the change of the state of the process system's functional reliability (concerning winterization) subject to disruptions to quantify the resilience. It also helps to identify the extent to which the internal or external measures facilitate the enhancement of the system resilience.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description on DBN and its application to resilience assessment. The approach to dynamically calculate the resilient profile is presented in Section 3. Following this section, a case study on quantitative resilience assessment of the winterized separator (considering the power loss scenario) is presented with the results and discussion. Section 5 concludes the work and discusses future work.
Dynamic Bayesian network
DBN is a BN representation in a discretized time domain. As in BN, DBN consists of child nodes, parent nodes, and arcs between them constituting conditional probabilities. Arcs are linked from parent nodes to child nodes, and the nodes that are not linked to any parent nodes are called root nodes. Marginal probabilities are assigned to root nodes.
In BN the joint probability distribution is found by multiplication of all the probabilities of the nodes given their immediate parents (eq. 1).
Where n stands for the number of nodes, and Pa(X i ) stands for parent nodes of node X i .
Similarly, in DBN, the joint probability is found not only by multiplication of nodes' probabilities in the same time step but also considering the nodes and their connection in the previous time steps (eq. 2).
where Pa X 0 i À Á ; ::Pa X i−2 i À Á ; Pa X i−1 i À Á ; Pa X i i À Á stand for parent nodes at time steps 0, …, t-2, t-1, t, while X i−1 i represents previous state of the node at time step t-1.
If new data is available, the posterior probabilities are estimated based on eq. 3 (Khakzad 2015) :
where P(X| E) is the posterior probability, and E is the new observation. This study will use DBN to monitor the probability of the system to restore to the normal operational state after the impact of the disruption. DBN is the applicable method for the probability estimation for resilience assessment because it enables the estimation of the joint probability of the nodes at the current time and all preceding times. This facilitates the evaluation of the probability change from the high functionality state to the low functionality state under the disruption effect, or the probability to sustain the high functionality state under the effect of the disruption. The dynamic representation of the change of the probability of the state of the system's functionality enables the monitoring of the time where the system exhibits the low functionality state and the amount of time the system takes to restore to the normal operational state.
The previous work on the resilience assessment or quantification of the change of the functionality state was done by Yodo et al. (Yodo et al. 2017) . In their research they proposed to consider the resilience as the sum of the functionality and restoration states of the system. However, they have not considered the variation of the resilience with time and considered the resilience as a constant term.
In the present study, the temporal variation of the resilience based on the disruption effect, and impact of the absorption, adaptation and restoration parameters on the resilience are considered. The results will help obtain the information on the separator response to the power loss and the time required for the system to recover to the normal operational state. Fig. 1 presents the procedure for dynamic resilience assessment while Fig. 2 schematizes the outcome of the procedure (Tong and Yang 2019) . In this work, resilience is defined as:
Methodology
& The probability that the system maintains a "high functionality" state after or during the occurrence of a disruption. & The probability that the system restores from a "low functionality" state back to a "high functionality" state given a disruption (Tong and Yang 2019) .
In the following sections, each step of the proposed method will be discussed.
Identify the absorption, adaption and restoration parameters
As it was previously stated the absorption characterizes the ability of the system to sustain the normal operational state or high functionality state after or during the occurrence of a disruption by absorbing the destructive impacts on the system. The absorption parameters are characterized by the inherent safety design parameters, such as heat tracing in the present analysis.
Adaptation parameters are auxiliary parts of the system that return the system to the normal operational state automatically. This could be the process safety equipment such as the safety relief valves, temperature controllers and flow controllers.
Restoration parameters are characterized by the external forces that return the system to the normal operational state. This could be maintenance works, update of the safety procedure, and management organizational rules. The identified parameters are then used to construct a bow-tie diagram.
Construct the BT diagram
Bow-Tie analysis is a graphical approach that enables observing the development of a system's malfunction scenarios (i.e., Top Event) starting from the root causes and finishing with the consequences (Zhang et al. 2018) . It consists of a fault tree and an event tree. In the fault tree, the root and intermediate causes of the malfunction are disclosed; whereas in the event tree, the consequences are presented according to the corresponding safety barriers in responses to the disruption. The disadvantage of the BT approach is its inability to present the dynamic representation of the probabilities and incapability to update the probabilities with new information entered (Zhang et al. 2018) . Therefore, in this study, the BT will be mapped into DBN to quantify the resilience.
The BT diagram was constructed by simulating the failure of the absorption parameters in the fault tree part. The adaptation and restoration parameters were inserted into the event tree part as the safety barriers.
Map BT to DBN
For mapping BT to DBN the absorption, adaptation and restoration parameters were extracted and presented as the "Absorption", "Adaptation" and "Restoration" nodes accordingly. The three abovementioned notes with the "Learning" node were connected to the "State of Functionality" node. The Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) of the nodes are then filled with the probabilities of failure and success based on the estimations done with the Markov Model (Section 3.7), literature data and expert judgement.
Estimate the probabilities of reliability states of the system by running the DBN model
The GeNIe Simulation (GeNIe Modeler -BayesFusion n.d.) estimates the joint probability of the functionality state based on eq. 2 for the time steps in the specified time interval. The resultant probability versus time steps curve are presented in Fig. 6 . S1, S2 S3, and S4 represent the states of the system functionality. S1 represents the initial state of the system at the time(t 1 ) when the disruption occurred. After the disruption occurrence, the state of the system functionality drops, resulting in the state of the low functionality at the state S2 The transient resilience model (Tong and Yang 2019) and S3. Adaptation and restoration stages of the system occur at the S2 and S3 stages of the system. The impact of the adaptation and restoration parameters on the system performance finally results in the recovery of the system to the normal operational state or the high functionality of the system state, i.e., S4.
Develop the dynamic resilience curve
Dynamic resilience curve as presented in the Figs. 2 and 7 is derived based on the addition of the initial state (S1) of the system's functionality and the final recovered functionality state of the system (S4). This idea was previously proposed by Yodo et al. (Yodo et al. 2017) , however, without considering the transient variation of the probability (Yodo et al. 2017) .
The dynamic variation of the probability changes for the sum of states S1 + S4 was developed by Tong and Ming (Tong and Yang 2019) and is implemented in the present study. According to (Holling 1973) , the initial state of the system, prior to the occurrence of disruption was denominated by S1 in Fig. 2 . In this figure, the decline of the functionality state is represented by the graph between states S1 and S2, adaptation by that from S2 to S3, and restoration by that from S3 to S4, and the learning can contribute to both state change from S2 to S3 and S3 to S4. S4 represents the new normal operational state of the system. The high learning capability of the system designates that the absorption, adaptation, and restoration will have high capacity or consequently higher resilience if the disruption occurs.
Revise the design of the process system to improve the resilience At this stage the resilience of the system is observed after addition of the resilience parameters for each nodes "Absorption", "Adaptation", "Restoration" correspondingly. The increase of the resilience of the system with addition of the safety measures proves the correctness of the built model. The increase of the resilience of the system is characterized by longer time to reach the lowest probability of the state of the system's functionality, higher value of the lowest probability, increased or the same probability of having the high functionality state after the adaptation and restoration stages.
The longer time to reach the lowest probability and a higher value of the lowest probability characterizes the strong absorption characteristics of the designed system. At the same time, having the system returned to the normal operational state designates both the ability of the system to restore and the effectiveness of the adaptation and restoration parameters.
Reassess the resilience of the system and compare with the previous resilience curve
The resilience of the system is reassessed by conducting sensitivity analysis on the nodes that exert the highest impact on the state of reliability of the system, or critical nodes. After the critical nodes are identified, the pieces of evidence at time slots are implemented in the DBN and the resilience change due to these implementations is checked. Understanding which parameters contribute to the highest drop of the functionality due to disruption or which parameters result in a faster recovery to the normal operational state enables the advancement of the developed model, enhancement of the inherently safe design, and focusing on the development and use of the most impactful adaptation and restoration parameters.
In the work of Tong and Yang (Tong and Yang 2019) , the four states are quantified by application of the Markov Chain Model using parameters presented in Table 1 . The λ 1 ,μ1,μ 2 ,λ 2 are the transition probabilities referring to absorption, adaptation, restoration, and learning correspondingly ( Fig. 3 ) (Tong and Yang 2019) .
The states in the Markov Model are defined in the following way:
& S1: The normal state at time t 1 when the disruption occurs & S2: The state with the lowest functionality due to disruption occurrence at time t 2 & S3: The state of the system after the adaptation stage at time t 3 & S4: The recovered state of the system after restoration is finished at time t 4 .
As presented in Fig. 3 the transitions from states S1 to S2, S2 to S3, S3 to S4 and S4 to S1 are characterized with the transitional probabilities λ 1 , μ1, μ 2 , λ 2 correspondingly. There λconstant failure rate, inverse of the mean time between failure(MTBF), λ ¼ 1 MTBF , and μrepair rate, inverse of the mean time to repair, μ ¼ 1 MTTR (Tong and Yang 2019) . The obtained values for S1, S2, S3, and S4 are then used in the Conditional Probability Table ( CPT) of node "State of Functionality" in the DBN model (Fig. 4) .
In Fig. 4 , the generic DBN model for quantifying resilience is displayed. It consists of six nodes: child note (leaf node) -"State of Functionality" and five parent nodes: "Disruption", "Absorption", "Adaptation", "Restoration" and "Learning". "Learning" is a parent n o d e f o r n o d e s " A b s o r p t i o n " , " A d a p t a t i o n " , "Restoration". This designates that the Learning ability of the system affects the ability of the system to absorb failure, adapt to disruption, and restore from it after the subsequent mishap (Tong and Yang 2019) . "Disruption" node characterizes external and internal factors that may facilitate the malfunction and the decrease of the functional reliability of the system if the absorption was not high enough to confront the disruption effects.
T h e j o i n t p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h e " S t a t e o f t h e Functionality" node is calculated based on eq. 2, and it assumes that the probabilities of the system and contributing factors at the time (t-1) influence the resilience of the system at time t. The Transient resilience model (Fig. 2) is obtained by adding the probabilities of S1 and S4 calculated using DBN (Tong and Yang 2019) . 
Case study
Development of the DBN model
The proposed method was applied to the resilience assessment of a separator system with electric heat tracing operating in the Arctic conditions. According to an experienced operator, the main disruption to this system is the failure of the selfregulating electric heat tracing. The failure may lead to a rapid decrease in the operating temperature of the separator, causing wax and hydrate formation on the separator, which could impair its operation and create blockages of process piping. In such cases, the adaptation and restoration components of the system will be activated that can be modeled as safety barriers in the Bow-Tie analysis. The Bow Tie was developed for this case as in Fig. 5 . The leading causes of the failure of the electrical heat tracing were identified through literature review and an interview with an operator who has vast experience of operations in harsh cold environments. These causes are the power loss (particularly the outage of the main power generator and the standby generator), overcurrent protection and residual current device tripping. These causes were further reasoned by other intermediate causes ending up with the root (basic) causes ( Table 2) .
The basic events from A to LT in the above table represent the human factor probabilities. They were estimated by applying the Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART), following the guidelines, and using data from Noroozi et al. (Yang et al. 2013) . Snow accumulation probability was obtained from the snowfall data taken from Pomeroy (Pomeroy and Li 2000) . Icing probability was estimated as the average probability throughout the year in the Arctic by implying data from Podofillini (Podofillini 2015). Table 5 The classification of consequences in the BT and their association with functionality state
Consequences
Reliability Classification C1 Loss of main power with imminent reinstatement i.e. short term with no intervention required. Utilities and production are restarted once main power has been re-established.
Medium functionality C2 Loss of main power with no loss of standby power i.e. standby power is available, all 'essential' i.e. safety and life support systems and 'asset protection' trace heating is available on emergency (standby) power.
Medium functionality C3 Power reinstatement, monitoring of the system temperature, inspection for the snow accumulation or icing, removal of those with the steam lances Medium functionality C4 Fully Resilient system in terms of power availability, human factor minimization, staff knowledge and upgrade of work philosophies based on the results of periodic inspection works High functionality C5 System failure may mostly be reasoned by human factor Low functionality C6 System failure may mostly be reasoned by human factor and lack of knowledge of personnel Medium functionality C7 System failure may mostly be reasoned by human factor,lack of knowledge of personnel and ignorance to upgrade the documentations based on the results of periodic inspections Low functionality C8 System failure probability is high due to the high possibility of the generator being covered with ice or snow as well as due to human factor, lack of knowledge of personnel, and ignorance to upgrade the documentations based on the results of periodic inspections Low functionality C9 System failure probability is high due to increased chance of power loss as well as due to human factor, lack of knowledge of personnel, and ignorance to upgrade the documentations based on the results of periodic inspections Low functionality C10 The restoration works on the system are not possible without conducting an inspection Low functionality C11 The system is not ready for restoration works Low functionality For the rest of the basic events (MBD to LCTS), the marginal probabilities were assumed to be 0.6. The BT (Figs. 5 and 6) was mapped into the DBN model ( Fig. 7) . For legibility of the BT diagram, the fault tree and event tree constituents are presented separately in Figs. 5 and 6. The fault tree events were transferred as the parent nodes for the "Disruption" node ( Table 3 ). The safety barriers were classified as factors contributing to "Adaptation" and "Restoration" capabilities of the separator (Table 4 ). The consequences in BT are presented in Table 5 . The probabilities presented in Table 2 were then inserted in the CPTs of the corresponding root nodes of the DBN.
Results and discussions
Resilience assessment using the DBN model
The DBN model of the separator was built, and the dynamic resilience was computed with the GeNIe modeler (GeNIe Modeler -BayesFusion n.d.) (Fig. 7 ). The DBN model was computed for 100 time-steps with each time step being assumed to be equivalent to one hour of operation. The conditional probabilities for the four states of reliability (S1, S2, S3, and S4) were assigned in the CPT of the "State of Functionality" node applying the data in Tables 1 and 6 (Yodo et al. 2017 ). Fig. 8 presents the dynamic probability profile of the aforementioned four different functionality states of the system. S1 starts from the time when the disruption occurs (the system having a high functionality state at time t = 0). S1-S2 region (from t = 0 till the intersection of the S1 curve with the S2 curve) shows the region where the state of the system functionality decreases, because the absorption capability of the system was not high enough, disruption occurred at 8 h, after the adaptation (S2-S3) has started. S2-S3 region is the region from intersection of S1 and S2 curves till the intersection of S1 and S3 curves. S3-S4 region starts from the intersection of S1 and S3 curves and continues up till the end of S4 curve. As it can be seen, at 20 h, the adaptation curve reaches its peak and then decreases for letting the restoration (S3-S4) take place, bringing the system to the new state of S4. After 60 h, the probabilities of all the four functionality states are stabilized. The newly achieved probability of functionality of the separator after the restoration is S4 = 97.73%. Figure 9 shows the resilience profile of the separator. The profile is obtained by summing the probabilities of the initial state of functionality, S1, and the recovered state of the system, S4. It could be seen that the resilience of the system changes with time until it stabilizes at about 60 h with a new resilience of 98.48%. The rapid decline of the resilience at 9 h is associated with the disruption due to the heat tracing failure, and a further increase of the resilience from that stage is due to the system's adaptation and external restoration attempts. The learning capability of the system during this process of disruption occurrence would contribute to an increase in absorption, adaptation, and restoration capabilities. This would consequently facilitate the achievement of higher levels of system resilience.
Design for a more resilient system
With the purpose to validate the model, the posterior analysis was conducted using the DBN model. Additional nodes (shown in Table 7 ) were placed as parent nodes for Table 7 Additional parameters Absorption Anti-freeze additives or use of low-temperature fluids in liquid systems
Wind barriers for equipment (exacerbating snow accumulation too) Adaptation Automated steam lances are used for ice removal from separator and auxiliary equipment Independent temperature limitation devices. An additional, independent temperature limiter ensures that if the control thermostat fails, the surface temperature of the heating cable will not exceed the maximum allowed temperature for the hazardous area by switching off the heating cable. Restoration Size overcurrent protective devices according to the design specification and/or local standard practices. This means to accurately select the ampere, voltage and interrupting ratings for overcurrent protective devices based on the design specification and/or local standard practices. Fig. 9 The dynamic change of the separator's resilience "Absorption", "Adaptation" and "Restoration". A new DBN model (Fig. 10 ) was developed.
The system has already undergone the disruption and learning process throughout its recovery. The joint probabilities of "State of Functionality" in 100 h were re-estimated by GeNIe [211] . The addition of safety measures facilitates the enhancement of the system's resilience. Therefore, the separator resilience obtained at this stage should be higher than the previous one.
From Fig. 11 and Table 8 it could be seen that disruption has occurred at 11 h, indicating a higher absorption for the refined DBN model. The resilience declined to 53%, which is 7% higher than that of the previous model. The final resilient state S4 is presumably the same S4 = 98.27% as obtained in Section 4.1. However, it takes a longer time for the resilience to stabilize, i.e., t 4 = 70 h. This is because the added parameters (operations) have their own operational time that contribute to the longer duration of the resilience stabilization. These results partially validate the DBN model for resilience assessment as the predicted resilience increased as additional arrangement was made to improve the system's adaption. Having the resilience dynamics helps to determine the extent to which the disruption may affect the system functionality and how long it takes (depending on the time-step amount) to recover the system to the normal operational state with the addition of resilience measures.
For normal operation, we assume that at least 90% of its original resilience needs to be achieved. 90% probability of recovery to the high functionality state is obtained as shown in Fig. 11 The resilience of the separator with new design Fig. 9 at about 40 h, which is longer than the previous case due to the additional hours of the newly added stabilizing operations in Fig. 8 .
Posterior analysis
For posterior analysis, four nodes were selected, "Snow", "Icing", "Power Supply" and "Safe Exposure Times". For each of them, pieces of evidence were recorded for 10-time steps ( Table 9 ). The "Yes" evidence in Table 9 designates a 100% probability of occurrence of each event in the node. The given analysis is conducted for observing how the separator will restore in case of the continuous snowfall, icing formation above the equipment, loss of one of the power supply units and increased human factor due to the long period of work in the cold. As a result, the resilience curve in Fig. 12 is obtained. Table 10 presents the comparison between the prior ( Fig. 9 ) and posterior ( Fig. 12 ) resilience analysis results. Even though the disruption effect was higher with the malfunction of the power supply system, the increase of human factor, and the harsh environmental conditions, the separator with the advanced resilience attributes was able to restore to its normal operational state (98.52%). However, the damage to the reliability of the system was higher, with the reliability reducing to 35% and with more extended time for the system to restore (70 h).
Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity analysis was conducted to identify the critical parameters contributing to the variation of the system resilience. First, the node "State of Functionality" was selected as the target node for sensitivity analysis. Then each of the parameters was sequentially changed to the low operational state and high error probability state. Table 11 presents all these scenarios. The dynamic resilience curve was obtained for each scenario, and the summary of the results was presented in Table 12 . The most significant reduction of the system's resilience occurs when the state of absorption is low. This designates the weak inherent safety design of the system. The most significant effect resulting in the drop of the absorption occurs due to malfunction of the Residual Current Device, Overcurrent Protection and the Standby Generator. The proper adaptation and restoration parameters facilitate the restoration of the system in the short amount of time compared with the change in the other nodes (Table 12 ). The parameters that contribute to a shorter time of resilience recovery are adaptation parameters, such as the generator power increases to the corresponding and maximum value in response to the temperature drop, and the standby generator activation. As for the restoration parameters the most effect on the fast resilience recovery is due to the factors such as redundancy of the power supply equipment, the upgrade of the basis of design document, the increase of the human reliability factors due to shelter construction for maintenance works, safe exposure times and trainings for the operating personnel. For scenarios 5, 6, and 7 the 
State of FuncƟonality
Time steps (hrs) Fig. 12 The resilience profile obtained as a result of the posterior analysis High error probability of Overcurrent protection Scenario 7
High error probability that RCD Trips Scenario 8
Generator power does not increase to the corresponding value Scenario 9
Low Absorption Scenario 10
Low Adaptation system shows the least change of the resilience due to the wellthought safety design, responding to restore the system to the normal operational state.
Conclusions
The highly uncertain harsh Arctic environments and their impacts on process systems' performance, and the lack of operational experience and historical data make risk assessment of process operations more challenging. For process systems operating in harsh environments, resilience assessment is more suitable as it can better deal with uncertain events during predisruption and post-disruption stages. The DBN model is considered more appropriate than other models because it can: (i) incorporate both objective and subjective data and information, (ii) assess the dynamics of resilience, and (iii) perform resiliency updating. The proposed quantitative resilience assessment method is developed based on a new resilience definition, which measures the resilience in terms of the probability of functionality state changing from "low" to "high".
The case study shows that the proposed method could generate a dynamic resilience profile, which could assist in the estimation of systems' capability to withhold uncertain disruptions, monitoring their performance variation, assessing the effectiveness of safety measures, and identification of potential design and operational improvements. As for the future perspectives, it is planned to validate the obtained resilience assessment model using Aspen HYSYS dynamic process simulator to model systems and preprogram their disruptions. By analyzing the effects of these disruptions, the systems' performance change can be obtained and compared. Sensitivity analysis will also be performed to obtain the effective operational measures for resilience enhancement. To improve the proposed approach, recovered performance loss will be considered together with the probabilistic term of resilience to obtain a new measure for resilience. 21.78 16 40 5 5 2 . 4 7 1 1 3 9 6 5 2 . 9 4 1 1 3 9 7 5 2 . 9 3 1 1 4 0 8 5 0 1 2 4 0 9 0 . 2 5 2 2 3 10 16.87 17 43
